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Abstract
There is strong empirical evidence that firms do not always adjust their capital
structure according to established capital structure theories. Rather, they follow
a passive strategy such that capital structure changes are mainly driven by their
stock returns. This paper investigates to what extent this behavioral inertia can
be explained by the structure of executive compensation. Our data comprise US
firms in the manufacturing industries over the years 1992 to 2000. We estimate
a dynamic panel data model and find evidence for the hypothesis that stronger
incentives schemes for CEOs lead to less capital structure inertia.
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1 Introduction
How do firms really decide on their capital structure? Do they adjust the mix of debt
and equity according to theories of optimal capital structure? A recent paper by Welch
(2002) provides strong empirical evidence for the hypothesis that firms do not always
adjust their capital structure based on to these well-established theories, but that the
firms are basically inert and their capital structure changes are mainly driven by their
stock returns. If there is a positive shock to the enterprise value, for instance, a firm’s
bankruptcy risk decreases. According to theory we expect the firm to increase its
leverage to capture additional tax benefits of debt. When the firm does not adjust its
leverage, i.e., if it follows an inertia strategy, its debt-to-equity ratio decreases.
While Welch (2002) proposes a neat quantitative approach for measuring the firms’
capital structure inertia behavior1, he does not explain why firms are inert. The aim
of our paper is to try to explain firms’ capital structure inertia via the structure of
the executive compensation. We claim that capital structure inertia is, at least partly,
related to the agency problem caused by the separation of ownership and control of the
firm. It is well known from agency theory that firms can use, e.g., cash compensation,
stock option awards or ownership in the firm as incentives for executives to align their
interests with those of the firm owners. We also know from capital structure theory
that the use of these incentive schemes may interact with the firms’ capital structure
choice.
A number of papers investigate the relationship between capital structure choice
and executive compensation. Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) examine the relationship
between common stock and option holdings of managers and the choice of investment
and financing decisions by firms. They provide empirical evidence for the hypothesis
that security holdings by executives may reduce the agency problem in the sense that
they induce executives to make investment and financing decisions in the interest of
shareholders.
Friend and Lang (1988) test whether capital structure decisions are motivated by
1Welch is not the first to raise the issue of capital structure inertia (see also, e.g., Fischer, Heinkel
and Zechner (1989), Leland (1994), Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) or Shyam-Sunder and Myers
(1999)). His primary contribution relative to the existing empirical literature on capital structure
is not so much to pointing out the presence of inertia, but that it causes stock returns to become
the primary driver of observed capital structure. Also, his approach allows to focus primarily on the
quantitative, and not just on the qualitative dimension of capital structure inertia.
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managerial self interest, by inquiring whether managers are willing and able to reduce
the level of debt below that chosen by public investors. The underlying hypothesis is
that managers prefer lower debt levels since debt represents a greater non-diversified
risk to the management than to public investors. They show that the firms’ debt level
decreases as the shares held by the managers increase. Also, firms have a higher average
debt ratio if they have large non-managerial stockholders.
Agrawal and Nagarajan (1990) investigate to what extent equity-financed and lever-
aged firms differ with respect to financial, managerial and ownership characteristics.
Their results suggest that managers of all-equity firms have significantly larger stock-
holdings than managers of similar-sized leveraged firms in the same industry.
John and John (1993) study how design and mix of external claims issued by the
firm affect the optimal management compensation structure. Their work provides a
theoretical explanation for a parallel decrease in the pay-to-shareholder-wealth sensi-
tivity of a firm’s managerial compensation and the level of debt and the complexity of
capital structure, an effect which has been documented in existing empirical studies.
Lyandres (2001) shows that executive compensation can substitute for debt in com-
mitting managers to a certain strategic behavior. His empirical results reveal that in-
centive based compensation can be explained by leverage, growth options and size of
the firm as well as by industry competitiveness.
We extend Welch’s (2002) framework by integrating characteristics of the firms’ ex-
ecutive compensation. Using a dynamic panel data model to investigate to what extent
capital structure inertia can be explained by the structure of executive compensation,
we compute three variables to measure the strength of incentives for CEOs and use
dynamic panel data estimations to relate them to the firms’ capital structure choice.
In addition, we look at the relationship between capital structure inertia and firm per-
formance as well as the importance of transaction costs. Our sample is comprised of
US firms in manufacturing industries over the time period from 1992 to 2000.
From our analysis we find evidence for the existence of capital structure inertia
in our sample. Our results provide empirical support for the hypothesis that capital
structure inertia can, at least partly, be explained by certain characteristics of executive
compensation. The stronger the incentives for executives are, the more actively do the
firms adjust their capital structure. This finding is consistent with agency theory. We
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also show that firms with higher capital structure inertia suffer from lower performance.
Finally, our results raise some methodological doubts about the validity of the common
empirical capital structure models.
The innovative aspect of the paper is that it combines for the first time the problem
of capital structure inertia with the structure of executive compensation. In addition, it
improvesWelch’s estimation method by applying a dynamic panel data estimator which
is more appropriate for the data structure in overcoming the potential inconsistency
problem of OLS. We see this paper as a further contribution to the growing literature
on the interplay between capital structure and executive compensation.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the empirical model used to
measure capital structure inertia. Section 3 outlines the relevant features of executive
compensation and their links to capital structure. Section 4 contains the data descrip-
tion. The analysis is in section 5, and the conclusion in section 6. Some supplementary
statistics can be found in the appendix.
2 The model for measuring capital structure inertia
Based on Welch (2002), we consider the following model for measuring capital structure
inertia. Let the actual or current debt ratio adrit of firm i in year t be defined as the
ratio of long-term debt (Compustat item [9]) and current liabilities [34] dit over the
sum of long-term debt and current liabilities dit and the market value of equity eit
([25]∗[199]), i.e., 2
adrit =
dit
dit + eit
∗ 100 (1)
When firm i neither issues nor retires debt or equity, i.e., when it does not optimize
its capital structure, the firm’s stock valuation is the main determinant of its debt
ratio. This behavior is captured by the inert debt ratio idrit−1,it as given by (2), where
rit−1,it is the external stock return from t− 1 to t.
idrit−1,it =
dit−1
dit−1 + eit−1(1 + rit−1,it)
∗ 100 (2)
2Besides the current debt ratio, we also look at other debt ratios such as the short term, long term
and convertible debt ratio. Results are in the appendix.
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idrit−1,it is the debt ratio that will result if the firm does nothing. By construction, the
inert debt ratio moves with changes in equity value but is not affected by managers’
capital structure decisions.
We estimate a model where the current debt ratio adrit is a function of its lagged
value adrit−1 and the inert debt ratio idrit−1,it , i.e.,
adrit = α0 + α1adrit−1 + α2idrit−1,it + ηi + γt + uit (3)
i = 1, .., Nj and t = 1, ..Ti
where i is the firm index and t is the time index. The inclusion of the lagged debt ratio
as explanatory variable allows for endogenous persistence. ηi depicts the unobservable
firm-specific effect and takes into account possible heterogeneity for which we do not
explicitly control. γt stands for the time specific effects
3. Finally, uit is the remainder
disturbance, with uit ∼ IID(0,σ2u) independent of each other and among themselves.
This setup as given by (3) allows us to decompose the firms’ conduct into a read-
justment behavior, which is returning to its previous debt ratio, and into an inert
behavior. In the case that the firm completely readjusts to its former debt ratio, we
expect α1 to be greater than or equal to one and α2 to be less than or equal to zero.
On the other hand, when firms are completely inert, α2 is equal to one and α1 is zero.
Accordingly, the smaller α1 and the larger α2, the more inert the firms are. We can
formulate the hypotheses as follows:
Readjustment hypothesis : α1 ≥ 1,α2 ≤ 0 (4)
Inertia hypothesis : α1 = 0,α2 = 1 (5)
The standard approach taken by empirical capital structure studies consists of
regressing a firm’s debt ratio on a set of explanatory variables derived from different
theories of capital structure . The typical capital structure determinants include firms’
collateral value of assets, size, non-debt tax shields, profitability, growth opportunities,
uniqueness captured by the relative importance of their R&D or sales expenses, taxes,
3The time-specific effects may capture factors like macroeconomic variables or other conditions
which affect all firms in the same way.
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volatility of earnings as well as debt constraints which limit the firm in adjusting its
capital structure. A detailed description of these capital structure determinants can
be found in the appendix.
In order to assess the validity of the standard capital structure approach and to see
the effect of the inert debt ratio, we also estimate the variations of the model given by
equation (6), where Xit−1 is a vector of standard capital structure determinants lagged
by one period as mentioned above, and adr and idr are defined as before.
adrit = α0 + α1adrit−1 + α2idrit−1,it +Xit−1β + ηi + γt + uit (6)
3 Capital structure inertia and executive compen-
sation
The capital structure of a firm is not only determined by internal and external factors
which reflect concerns of risk and control, but also bythe preferences of their managers,
which may play an important role. This perspective is known as the strategy-capital
structure relationship.4 There is, however, a managerial incentive problem, which stems
from the fact that the decisions of the managers are influenced by their personal wealth
considerations.
Based on agency theory, several theoretical and empirical studies have suggested
that managers, with their non-diversified human capital invested in the firm, have in-
centives to reduce their non-diversified employment risks by ensuring the continued
survival of the firm.5 Typical incentives schemes to align the managers’ interests with
those of the firm owners include cash compensations, stock option awards and owner-
ship shares of the firm as compensation mechanisms.6
In what follows, we are interested in the incentive problem with respect to the firm’s
capital structure choice, and more specifically how this is related to capital structure
inertia. Our main hypothesis is that less inert firms are, the stronger the incentives for
their executives are.
We consider four variables used to measure the strength of incentives for executives:
4See Barton and Gordon (1988).
5See, e.g., Amihud and Lev (1981).
6See, e.g., Kedia (1998).
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(1) option share of total compensation, (2) pay-performance sensitivity, i.e., the extent
to which compensation is tied to changes in the market value of the firm, (3) the extent
of the variable compensation component, and (4) firm ownership by the CEO.
3.1 Stock options granted relative to total compensation
Stock options are the right to buy stocks at a predetermined price in the future. They
are typically awarded to align CEO incentives with those of the shareholders in order
to reduce the agency conflict.7 Stock option awards also provide incentives against
short-termism among managers.
The variable opt shareit measures the value of stock options granted to the executive
during the year as valued using S&P’s Black Scholes methodology relative to the total
compensation, i.e,
opt shareit =
blk valueit
tccit
∗ 100 (7)
where blk valueit is the value of stock option grants to the CEO8 and tccit is the total
current compensation, which includes the base salary (cash and non-cash) and bonus.
The higher the option share relative to the total compensation, the more executives
are expected to act in the interests of shareholders, and the higher is the strength of
their incentives.
Following Kedia (1998), we need to control for a number of factors. Managers tend
to have more private information about the firm’s projects in firms with high growth
opportunities. Given this information asymmetry, it is also more difficult to evaluate
the manager’s performance, and thus stock options are more often used in this kind
of environment. The firm’s growth opportunities are approximated by the variable q,
which is similar to Tobin’s q9.Furthermore, it is argued in the literature that firms
facing higher liquidity constraints and lower marginal tax rates are more likely to use
stock options as CEO compensation. Stock options do not result in an expense against
income and, therefore, do not absorb liquidity.10 We use the dummy variable liq cit to
7See, e.g., Haugen and Senbet (1981).
8The value is calculated while using the Black Scholes formula.
9Our proxy for growth opportunities q is defined as qit = [assetsit+(mktvalit−bookvalit)]/assetsit.
10See Matsunaga, Shevlin and Shores (1992). They also argue that managers of firms with higher
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measure liquidity constraints. It takes the values one if the firm does not pay a dividend
in the current year and zero if it does. Given the considerations on firm performance
and transaction costs in relation to capital structure inertia, we include the return on
assets roait and firm size sizeit as additional control variables in a second specification.
3.2 Pay-performance sensitivity
The dollar change in CEO wealth per dollar change in firm value, which is also called
the compensation elasticity comp elit, is a common strength of incentive measure.11
It measures the extent to which the executive’s compensation changes relative to a
change in the firm’s market value, i.e.,
comp elit =
tdc1 pctit
mktval pctit
(8)
where tdc1 pctit is the change in total compensation, which includes total current com-
pensation tccit plus total value of stock options granted, and mktval pctit is the change
in market value of common stock from year (t− 1) to t. The higher the compensation
elasticity comp elit, the higher the strength of incentives.
The pay-performance sensitivity is a function of firm size. Jensen and Murphy
(1990), for instance, find higher compensation elasticities for smaller firms. This em-
pirical observation reflects the fact that the variance of shareholder wealth is larger for
large firms and therefore, the risk associated with a given pay-performance sensitivity
is also higher for the CEO of a large firm. The decrease of the pay-performance sen-
sitivity with firm size implies that the value of providing incentives for effort does not
increase with size as fast as the cost of risk bearing by the executive.12 Accordingly,
we again include firm size sizeit as a control variable. In a further specification, we
again add the return on assets roait to control for firm performance.
financial reporting costs ( i.e., who are closer to violating bond convenants due to lower reported
earnings) choose accounting measures which result in higher reported earnings and should therefore
be compensated with more stock options. The reporting costs can be approximated by the ratio of
income available for interest payments to interest expense. Due to insufficient observations we do not
include this variable.
11See, e.g., Jensen and Murphy (1990) .
12See Schaefer (1998), and Baker and Hall (1998).
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3.3 Variable compensation share
We build the ratio of variable compensation over total compensation to measure the
extent to which the total compensation of the executive is variable, i.e.,
var compit =
tdc1it − salaryit
tdc1it
∗ 100 (9)
where tdc1 is the total current compensation including the base salary (cash and non-
cash), bonus and total value of stock options granted.
The larger the variable part of the compensation, the stronger are the incentives for
the executive. To control for firm performance and transaction costs, we again include
return on assets roait and firm size sizeit as additional control variables in a second
specification.
3.4 CEO firm ownership
It is widely recognized that the structure of equity ownership has important effects on
managerial incentives and firm value.13 Letting executives own part of the firm is one
way to align their interests with those of the owners. We measure CEO firm ownership
shrownpcit by the percentage of the company’s shares which the CEO owns, i.e.,
shrownpcit =
shares owned by CEO
total number of shares
∗ 100 (10)
Typically, the size of the firm is related to its ownership concentration.14 When a
firm grows, managers are likely to have a lower share due to wealth constraints and
efficient risk bearing. Therefore, we include sizeit as an additional variable, which
we again measure by the natural logarithm of total assets. We also control for the
volatility of the stock market returns bs volatit and the price of the shares at the end
of the fiscal year price closeit since they may affectexecutive shareownership as well.
Finally, we again include the return on assets roait in a second specification to control
for firm performance.
13See, e.g., Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama and Jensen (1983), or Shleifer and Visny (1986).
14See Demsetz and Lehn (1985).
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4 Data and descriptive statistics
4.1 The sample
Our sample contains firms in manufacturing industries, North American Industry Clas-
sification system (NAICS) 31 to 33, listed in the Compustat Executive Compensation
database over the years 1992 to 2001. We restrict our analysis to manufacturing indus-
tries since executive compensation schemes may differ significantly in other industries.15
All series are converted to real values in 2001 dollars using the consumer price index
(CPI) inflation series. The data include active as well as inactive firms, and we re-
tain the firm-years in which the variables used in the regressions are not missing. The
compensation figures refer to the remuneration of the CEO.
We combine the information on CEO compensation with the balance sheet and
profit and loss account data taken from the Compustat Industrial database. The basic
data set contains 1384 firms for which we have up to 9 years of observations. Due to
missing data, there are, however, fewer observations for most of the variables. Table 1
shows descriptive statistics for the main variables.
[insert table 1 about here]
5 Analysis
The analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we examine whether there is evidence for
capital structure inertia in our sample. This analysis allows us to assess the validity of
standard capital structure theories at the same time. In a second step, we discuss the
relationships between capital structure inertia and firm performance as well as the role
of transaction costs. Finally, we investigate our main hypothesis as to whether capital
structure inertia can be explained by the structure of executive compensation.
5.1 Does capital structure inertia exist?
To see whether the standard capital structure determinants have some explanatory
power or whether past stock returns are the primary determinants of the market-based
15(e.g., banking, insurance) mention paper which states that.
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debt ratio, we estimate variations of the model given by (6) with instrumental vari-
ables using the GMM dynamic panel data estimator as proposed by Arellano and
Bond (1991). Due to the inclusion of the lagged dependent explanatory variable and
its potential correlation with the error term, habitual panel data estimation proce-
dures such as fixed or random effects are asymptotically valid only when the number
of observations in the time dimension becomes large.16 As an additional advantage,
the instrumental variables approach solves problems of simultaneity bias between the
leverage measure and its explanatory variables, and it controls for other potential biases
such as unobserved heterogeneity and measurement errors.
For all the following estimation results we consider the explanatory variables to
be predetermined and instrument them by their lagged values up to the second lag.
This procedure eliminates the problem of endogeneity of regressors. To correct for
heteroskedasticity of uit, we compute the robust standard errors, which are again given
in brackets below the coefficients.17. The GMM estimator is consistent in case there is
no second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced idiosyncratic errors. We report
the z2 statistics, which follow a N(0, 1) distribution under the null hypothesis, to test
for no second order autocorrelation.. The Wald statistic, which is distributed as χ2,
tests for the joint significance of the included explanatory variables. Finally, the Sargan
test of over-identifying restrictions is asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null of
instrument validity. It jointly tests for the model specification and the validity of the
instruments. However, the Sargan test rejects too often when there is heteroskedasticity
in the data.18
[insert table 2 about here]
The second column of Table 2 reports the GMM estimates of model (6), i.e. with-
out inclusion of the inert debt ratio idrit−1,it but with the standard capital structure
determinants as explanatory variables. Besides the lagged debt ratio, no coefficient
is statistically significant, even though most of the coefficients of the standard capital
structure determinants carry the expected sign. Obviously, the current debt ratio is
16Further explanations about estimating dynamic panel data models can be found in the appendix.
17We tested for panel heteroskedasticity and found evidence for it.
18The Sargan test statistic is taken from the two-step estimator since it is not reported for the
one-step estimator with robust standard errors.
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best explained by its lagged value. Once we include the inert debt ratio, as reported in
the third column of Table 2, the lagged debt ratio loses its significance, and the inert
debt ratio is the only significant determinant. This means, for instance, that a firm,
on average, does not increase its leverage when its fixed assets ratio increases, or it
does not lower its leverage when it becomes more profitable, as predicted by economic
theory.
For a robustness check and comparability with Welch’s (2002) paper, we also es-
timate the model specifications with OLS. It allows us to investigate the effect of not
including the lagged dependent variable as a regressor. In contrast to the panel data
specification, the pooled OLS regressions, where each firm-year is one observation, does
not control for unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity.
The third column of table 2 reports the results from estimating the model with
OLS without including lagged and inert debt ratios. This corresponds to the standard
approach in the literature. All the standard capital structure determinants are statis-
tically significant, and except for tax shields tax ta and debt constraints debt con they
also carry the expected sign. Once we include the lagged debt ratio, as is reported in
the fifth column of table 2, however, all the coefficients except the fixed asset ratio fix
lose their significance. Looking at the R2, we observe that the explanatory power of the
regression increases dramatically with inclusion of the lagged debt ratio. Estimating
this type of model without including the debt ratio of the former period, which basi-
cally assumes that the current debt ratio does not depend on its past values, strongly
affects the results.
Finally, we add the inert debt ratio as a right hand side variable, which is significant
at the 1% level. Besides increasing the fit of the model by 10 percentage points, the
lagged debt ratio almost loses its significance. Given these results, we conclude that
the inert debt ratio seems to be the main capital structure determinant, and we use
model (3) as our main specification.
Firms may behave differently with respect to increasing or decreasing their debt
ratio. In order to see whether there is an asymmetry in the adjustment behavior,
we split up the sample into two subsample depending on the sign of the change in
debt ratio from period (t − 1) to t , i.e., whether ∆adrit > 0 or ∆adrit < 0, where
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∆adrit = adrit − adrit−1. 19 Similarly, we also split up the sample with respect to
whether firms are over- or underleveraged. The optimal leverage is approximated by
the fitted values of estimating equation (6) without lagged and inert debt ratio by
fixed effects. We then test for the difference between the coefficients by two-sided
means differences, whose significance level is reported in the table.
[insert table 3 about here]
As we can see from Table 3.a., there is indeed an asymmetry in capital structure
inertia behavior depending on whether the firms’ debt ratio increased or decreased
from period (t− 1) to t. Given the significant lower coefficient of idr in the subsample
with ∆adrit > 0 compared to the second subsample, firms tend to be more inert when
lowering their leverage. Given the dimension of the debt ratios, which lie in the interval
from 0 to 100%, even a small difference between coefficients has an economically sig-
nificant impact. Note that the number of firms that increased, or respectively lowered
their debt ratio does not differ very much.
Table 3.b. reports the results with respect to optimal leverage.We observe a more
inert behavior of firms which are overleveraged according to standard capital structure
theories. This is agai reflected in a higher and significant coefficient of idr in the
overleveraged subsample. Interestingly, the overleveraged firms form a clear majority.
5.2 Capital structure inertia and firm performance
So far, we have observed that firms do not adjust their leverage according to the well-
known theories of capital structure. We do, however, not know whether such behavior
is good or bad. It is possible that our empirical specification, which is based on static
capital structure theories, does not incorporate all the relevant factors which may
matter in a dynamic analysis of capital structure. In order to qualify the existence of
capital structure inertia, we analyze the relationship between the inertia behavior and
performance of the firm.
We use the return on assets roa, return on equity roe, a variable similar to Tobin’s
q20, profitability as well as earning per share to measure operating and market perfor-
19The difference between the total number of observations and the sum of the two subsamples is
due to the cases for which ∆adrit = 0.
20See definition in section 3.1.1.
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mance of the firm. There is an ongoing debate in the literature on whether (Tobin’s)
q or the roa are correct proxies for firm performance. While Tobin’s q is difficult to
measure, it is also often considered as a proxy for the firm’s growth opportunities rather
than its performance. On the other hand, the return on assets and other accounting
rates of return do not necessarily reflect the economic profit of the firm. An impor-
tant argument for using the roa is that this measure is highly relevant for executive
compensation decisions.21 We include the return on equity also to have a performance
measure of the equity stake.
We estimate model (3) again by GMM. We split up the sample depending on
whether the firm-specific value of the performance criterion is higher or lower than the
sample median in the same year22 and test for significance of the difference.
[insert table 4 about here]
As we can see from table 4, firms with relatively high returns on assets, high returns
on equity, high profitability and high earnings per share are clearly less inert than the
one with the relatively lower performance. This is reflected in a higher coefficient of
adrit−1 and a lower coefficient of idrit−1,it. These results are also robust with respect
to the alternative profitability measure profit over sales instead of reported profit over
total assets, for which we do not report the results. On the other hand, firms with higher
qit ratios, which reflect a larger growth potential, do not seem to differ significantly
from each other with respect to the inert debt ratio. For the robustness check, we use
the mean instead of the median for splitting up the sample. In addition, we estimate
the models with OLS. The results are very similar to the ones reported in table 4.
Even though we do not control for other factors which might affect the firm’s
profitability, we can conclude that firms with a higher performance are less inert with
respect to their capital structure choice.
5.3 Do transaction costs matter?
In the presence of transaction costs for issuing or retiring debt, firms rebalance their
debt ratio only after it crosses an upper or a lower limit. Transaction costs consists
21See also Mehran (1995).
22We choose the median instead of the mean because of the rather skewed distribution of some
variables.
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of a variable cost component which is proportional to the market value of raised or
retired debt. In addition, there is also a fixed cost, which is independent of the size
of the transaction.23 Due to the fixed cost component, it is commonly argued that
smaller firms face relatively higher transaction than larger firms.24 Accordingly, we
would expect smaller firms to adjust their capital structure less frequently. Graham
and Harvey (2001), however, find only moderate evidence that transaction costs matter
for debt issuance, especially for small firms. Welch (2002) provides some so called back-
of-the-envelope computations to show that financial transaction costs may only explain
part of the inertia behavior.
We investigate the role of transaction costs for capital structure inertia by splitting
up the sample into two subsamples depending on whether the firms are smaller or larger
than the median firm in the same year. We then run regression (3)for both subsamples
and test again for significance of difference between the coefficients. Besides size, we
consider the volatility of stock market valuations as another proxy for transaction costs.
Volatile firms may face larger transaction costs and are, therefore, expected to adjust
their capital structure less frequently.
[insert table 5 about here]
Table 5 shows that the smaller firms with supposedly higher transaction costs are
indeed more inert with respect to their capital structure choice compared to larger firms.
Also, more volatile firms seem to face higher costs of capital structure adjustment. The
results are robust when the sample is split up according to the mean as well as when
we use OLS as estimation method. These findings are also important for the choice
of control variables discussed in the next subsection, where we investigate how the
structure of executive compensation affects the firms’ inertia behavior.
5.4 Capital structure inertia and executive compensation
Given our discussion above, we claim that capital structure inertia can at least partly
be explained by the structure of executive compensation. Our main hypothesis is that
23See, e.g., Tittman and Tsyplakov (2002) for a dynamic capital structure model with variable and
fixed transaction cost.
24Tittman and Wessels (1988), for instance, interpret the finding that small firms use relatively
little debt as evidence that transaction costs discourage debt usage among small firms.
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firms are less inert with respect to their capital structure when their executives face
the prospect of stronger incentive schemes.
As outlined in section 3, we use four measures to approximate the strength of in-
centives for CEOs, namely option share, compensation elasticity, variable salary com-
ponent and shareownership. We interpret a higher value of these measures as stronger
incentives for the CEOs.
For each of these measures, we separately estimate model (3) by GMM. While doing
so, we split up the sample into two subsamples according to whether the firm-specific
observation of this incentive measure is lower or higher than the sample median of the
same year. For robustness check we use the mean instead of the median as split-up
criterion.
[insert table 6 about here]
Table 6.a. reports the results for the incentive measure option share opt shit. Re-
member that according to our empirical model for measuring capital structure inertia,
firms are more inert, the smaller the coefficient of adrit−1 and the larger the coefficient
of idrt−1,t. The firms in the subsample with the relatively low option share are clearly
more inert: The coefficient on the lagged debt ratio adrit−1 is smaller and the one
on the inert debt ratio idrt−1,t is larger than in the subsample with the higher option
share. The differences are statistically significant at the 1% level. This picture is con-
firmed when including size and return on assets as additional controls. Even though
the differences are not as large as before, they are still significant at the 1% level.
For robustness check, we estimate the relationships by using the year-specific sample
mean instead of the median to split up the sample. Our findings are fully confirmed.
The results for our second incentive measure, are shown in Table 6.b., where we
investigate whether a higher compensation elasticity comp elit provides proper incen-
tives for a more optimal or at least more active capital structure choice. Our results
show that firms that tie the compensation of their CEO closely to changes in the firm’s
market value are indeed less inert as well. We report a significantly lower coefficient
of adrit−1, and a higher coefficient of idrt−1,t in the subsample with the firms having a
lower compensation elasticity. The difference between the two subsamples remains as
great even after including the control for firm performance roait. The robustness check
with the mean instead of the median as sample split up again confirms our results.
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We find a similar picture when repeating the exercise for the incentive measure
variable salary component var salit. The results are outlined in Table 6.c. The firms
in the subsample with lower variable salary exhibit a stronger resistance to adjusting
their capital structure, which is again reflected in the lower coefficient of adrit−1 and
the higher coefficient of idrt−1,t. The robustness checks with the additional controls
sizeit and roait do not change our findings, even though the differences become smaller
from an absolute point of view. However, they are still significant at the 1% level.
Finally, we investigate the role of shareownership by the CEO for capital structure
inertia. As we can see from Table 6.d., we do not find less capital structure inertia
when CEOs own more shares in the firm. The coefficients of idrt−1,t do not significantly
differ from each other in either subsample, and the coefficients on the lagged debt ratio
even provide weak evidence for more inertia in firms where CEOs have a higher equity
stake. This finding persists when including our additional control variables, as well as
when using the mean for the sample split up.
At first glance, this finding appears somewhat puzzling. However, CEOs own on
average 6% of the company shares, which is relatively little. Accordingly, the incentive
effect of this mechanism may be rather weak in this context. Also, the capital struc-
ture inertia considered in this paper reflects a short-run behavior. It is possible that
shareownership has a more sustainable effect in the longer run.
To summarize, we find that firms where CEOs are compensated with relatively
more option shares, where their compensation is more closely tied to the firm’s market
value and where the variable salary component is greater are less inert with respect
to their capital structure choice. We interpret these findings as evidence for our main
hypothesis that stronger incentive schemes for executives lead to less capital structure
inertia. Accordingly, the structure of executive compensation may play in the better
understanding of capital structure inertia behavior of firms.
6 Conclusions
This paper provides further evidence for the claim that firms may fail to adjust their
capital structure according to the well-established capital structure theories. Based on
agency theory, we argue that capital structure inertia behavior is related to the struc-
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ture of the executive compensation. The stronger the incentives for CEOs, the less
inert the firms are with respect to their capital structure choice. We also investigate
the relationships between capital structure and various measures of firm performance
and find that inertia tends to be negatively correlated with firm performance. Finally,
we also explore the explanatory power of transaction costs, which are a common ex-
planation for capital structure inertia. Even though they may play a certain role, they
cannot be counted as a main determinant of capital structure inertia.
Additional research is needed for a more complete understanding of this topic. As-
suming that capital structure inertia is related to agency problems within the firm,
we can think of other factors which might possibly affect firms’ inertia behavior. Be-
sides the direct contractual provisions between owners and managers of the firm, there
are competitive market mechanisms where discipline is induced by capital-, labor- and
product markets. The intensity of product markets, for instance, acting as a substitute
mechanism for firm-internal compensation schemes, may affect firms’ inertia behavior.
The fact that we also find significant inter-industry differences with respect to capi-
tal structure inertia might provide some motivation for further investigations of this
hypothesis.
Also, it is likely that the role and importance of these internal and external gover-
nance mechanisms vary over time with the changing macroeconomic environment. In
a recession, for instance, managers may care more about efficiency in order to prevent
possible liquidation of the firm. Some of these issues will be addressed in future work.
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7 Appendix
7.1 The standard capital structure determinants
There exists a large theoretical literature on how firms choose their optimal capital
structure, and it has also been widely tested with firm data.25 According to the liter-
ature, the following factors are usually considered as main capital structure determi-
nants. All the ratios are expressen in percentages.
Collateral value of debt Firms with important fixed assets may obtain more favourable
conditions to secure debt. First, it may be easier for the lender to assess the value of
tangible assets compared to intangibles. Besides this problem of asymmetric infor-
mation, there is a higher probability of intangible assets to loose value in case of a
discovery, i.e., it may be easier to sell machinery than to obtain money for goodwill.
We use the total amount of fixed assets [Compustat item 7] over total assets [Compus-
tat item 6] to measure the importance of fixed assets of the firm, and expect a positive
relationship between the importance of fixed assets and leverage (fix).
Firm size Larger firms are likely to have more diversified market portfolios and therefore
face a lower probability of bankruptcy. As is further outlined by Titman and Wessels
(1988), direct bankruptcy costs, which are fixed, constitute a smaller portion of firm
value when the firm is larger. Accordingly, large firms may raise external capital at
lower costs than smaller firms. This argument suggests a positive influence of the firm’s
size on its debt level. According to Rajan and Zingales (1995), however, there may be
25give some references
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less asymmetric information about large firms, which decreases their need for external
finance. We approximate the size of the firm by logarithm of its total assets [6] (size).
Non-debt tax shields According to Modigliani and Miller (1958), interest tax shields
create strong incentives for debt issue. This holds, however, only when the firm has
enough taxable income to justify debt. The tax advantage of debt decreases when other
tax deductions like depreciation increase, which have a potentially negative effect on
leverage. We build the ratio of depriciation and amortizations [14] plus investment
tax credits [51] over total assets [6] to capture the importance of non debt tax shields
(shields).
Profitability As Myers and Majluf (1984) point out, firms have a pecking-order in
the choice of financing their projects. The least costly method is retained earnings,
and they should, therefore, prefer internal to external finance. The more profitable a
firm is, the lower is its need for external finance. However, when there is asymmetric
information about the quality of the firms, the more profitable companies may signal
their quality to the market with higher debt issue (Jensen 1986). We use the ratio
of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) [13] over total assets [6] to measure the
profitability of the firm (profit ass). In addition, we build the ratio of EBIT over sales
[12] as an alternative profitability measure (profit sal).
Growth According to Titman and Wessels (1988), firms with greater growth opportuni-
ties have more possibilities to invest suboptimally and to be able to expropriate wealth
from bondholders in favour of shareholders. Firms with higher exptected growth oppor-
tunities are expected to borrow less. We measure the growth potential of the firm by the
relative change of total assets [6] from the previous year to the current (growth ta).26
Uniqueness According to Titman and Wessels (1988), the uniqueness of a firm may
affect its capital structure. A more unique firm is expected to have a lower leverage.
26An alternative measure would be the ratio of book value of equity [60] over the market value of
equity [data25∗data199].
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We measure the uniqueness of the firm by the ratio of research&development expenses
[46] over total sales [12] (uniq rd).27
Tax shields Interest payments on debt are deductible from the bill. The tradeoff be-
tween tax svings and bancruptcy is the standard determinant in normative capital
structure theory. We approximate tax shields as ratio of paid income taxes [317] over
total assets [6](tax).
Volatility The more volatile a firm’s equity and earnings, the higher is the probability
of a bankruptcy from default on interest payments. Therefore, we expect more volatile
firms to have lower debt levels. We approximate volatility by the the standard deviation
of the rate of return on the stock (volat).
Debt constraints Following Welch (2002) we include the ratio of interest payments
[15] over EBIT [13] to measure the extent to which firms have leeway in adjusting their
capital structure (debt con). The higher the debt constraints, the lower the expected
leverage.
7.2 About estimating dynamic panel data models28
Consider a dynamic model for panel data, i.e.,
yit=α0 + βyit−1 + αi + εit, with i = 1, ...,N ; t = 1, 3
In general, when a model for panel data includes lagged dependent explanatory vari-
ables, the habitual estimation procedures are asymptotically valid only when the num-
ber of observations in the time dimension (T ) gets large. To remove the fixed effect,
we difference the data to obtain
yi3 − yi2 = β(yi2 − yi1) + (εi3 − εi2)
The problem arises from the failure of the assumption necessary for consistency, i.e.,
27An alternative measure would be the ratio of selling expenses [189] over sales [12].
28See also Arellano and Bond (1991), Ahn and Schmidt (1995) and Kiviet (1995).
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E [(εi3 − εi2) | (yi2 − yi1)] = −E [εi2 | (yi2 − yi1)] 9= 0
First-differencing thus introduces correlation between the new error term and the dif-
ferenced lagged dependent variable. The solution is to estimate the first-differenced
equation by using instrumental variables (IV), where the instruments are the depen-
dent variables lagged 2 periods or more. This method leads to consistent estimates
(which, however, may not be efficient as it does not use all moment conditions).
In this particular case, the solution is to find an instrument uncorrelated with
(εi3 − εi2) and correlated with (yi2 − yi1). The obvious candidate is yi1, which is the
dependent variable lagged twice yit−2. The GMM estimator is a generalized version of
this IV approach, with more than 2 periods and with predetermined right hand side
variables.
Let us consider this generalized version: Consider again the following model, where
we do not have a lagged dependent variable in the original model, i.e.,
yit=α0 + βxit + αi + εit with i = 1, ..., N ; t = 1, .., T
or
yit = α0 + βxit + αi + uit
Assume
E [εit | xiT , .., xit+1, xit, xit−1, .., xi1] 9= 0
but
E [εit | xit, xit−1, .., xi1] = 0
To remove the effect, we difference the model, i.e.,
∆yit = β∆xit +∆uit, i = 1, ..N ; t = 2, ..T
In case x is predetermined, there is potential correlation between xit and εit−1, and we
have
E [∆uit | ∆xit] = E [εit − εit−1 | xit − xit−1] 9= 0
However,
E [∆uit | xit−1, xit−2, .., xi1] = 0
23
which means that we can use all prior lags of x as instruments for the tth equation.
Note that the inclusion of yit−1 as regressor can be either due to the fact that
modelling a dynamic relationships usually requires inclusion of a lagged dependent
explanatory variables, or it may be the result of the first-differencing in order to re-
move unobserved effects. The problem of unobserved individual effects is their possible
correlation with included exogenous variables. Accordingly, GLS error component tech-
nique cannot be used. Time-specific unobserved effects can be removed by using time
dummies. Firm-specific unobserved effects can be eliminated by first-differencing the
equation. An alternative transformation to first differencing is the fixed effect treatment
of the model, which leads to the within estimator (least squares after transformation
to deviations from mean). However, this transformations also introduces the lagged
dependent variables as RHS variable, causing a correlation between the transformed
lagged dependent variable and the transformed error term, i.e., the within estimator is
inconsistent because it induces a correlation of order 1/T between the lagged dependent
variable
and the error.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Definitions of variables:  
adrit=(dit+eit)/eit, where dit=(longterm debt+current liabilites) and eit=(longterm debt+current liabilites+market value of equity); idr=dit-1/(dit-1+eit-1(1+rit-1,it), where rit-1,it is the 
external stock return from (t-1) to t; fix=fixed assets over total assets; size=log(total assets); shield=depriciation and amortizations plus investment tax credits over total assets; 
profit_ta=EBIT over total assets; growth_ta=relative change of total assets from year (t-1) to t;  uniq_rd=research&development expenses over sales; tax_ta=paid income taxes 
over total assets;  volat=the standard deviation of the rate of return on the stock;  debt_con=interest payments over EBIT; roa=return on assets; roe=return on equity; q=[total 
assets+(market value of equity-book value of equity)]/total assets; eps=earnings per share; opt_sh=(blk_value/tcc), where blk_value=value of stock option grants to CEO; 
tccit=total current compensation including base salary plus bonus; liq=liquidity constraints which takes the value of one if the firm did not pay a dividend in the last year and zero 
else;  comp_el= %change of  tdc/ %change mktval from year (t-1) to t, where tdc=total compensation (tcc plus options exercised) and mktval=market value of common stocks; 
var_sal=(tdc-salary)/tdc; shrownpc=% of company’s shares owned by CEO; price_closeit =price of the stock at the end of the fiscal year. The sample contains firms in the 
Compustat database over the years 1992 to 2001. All the series are expressed in $ of 2001. The ratios are expressed in %.  
 
abbreviation       description Mean Std. Dev.
 
Min. Qrt1 Median Qrt3 Max N
adr actual debt ratio         20.334 19.918 0 3.361 15.075 31.274 99.904 3627
idr inert debt ratio         19.307 19.527 0 2.896 13.906 29.283 99.898 3627
fix collateral value of debt        56.393 32.739 0 31.959 50.619 74.627 100 3623
size_ta firm size  11.354        1.509 5.815 10.297 11.172 12.262 17.199 3627
shield non-debt tax shields         4.746 2.804 0.291 3.251 4.439 5.708 58.945 2197
profit_ta profitability 14.449        14.918 -253.362 11.027 15.499 20.513 96.509 3618
growth_ta growth 21.728        47.632 -80.854 2.903 10.970 25.537 726.135 3627
uniq_rd uniqueness      25.563 208.299 0 1.385 3.693 10.285 7690.038 2647
tax_ta tax shields        3.432 3.929 -25.726 1.233 3.201 5.254 35.021 3626
volat volatilitiy        0.408 0.185 0.121 0.272 0.359 0.504 1.841 3435
debt_con debt constraints        5.928 513.451 -29715.15 2.992 9.300 17.813 3869.935 3449
roa return on assets         4.052 17.196 -388.316 2.291 6.016 9.782 57.469 3626
roe return on equity        11.413 113.015 -2399.735 6.042 13.399 19.821 3038.983 3626
q proxy for Tobin’s q 232.413 216.437     49.413 124.429 165.398 248.919 3911.903 3626
eps earnings per share 130.899 194.491      -3312.335 59.270 124.541 206.035 1672.73 3334
opt_sh option share 34.876      28.007 0 8.269 32.637 55.444 100 3329
liq liquidity     0.411 0.492 0 0 0 1 1 3627
comp_el compensation elasticity        1.408 88.556 -4103.662 -0.661 0.379 1.790 1836.073 3309
var_sal variable compensation share       65.537 23.071 0 53.528 70.927 82.516 100 3329
shrownpc shareownership of CEO 6.021 9.047 0.007 0.763 2 7.3 53.8 1974 
price_close stock price end of fiscal year 32.152 22.821 0.02 16.25 26.75 42.688 218 3627 
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Table 2. Capital structure determinants 
 
The table presents GMM (one-step estimator) and OLS estimates of the following regression: 
0 1 1 2 1, 1it it it it it i t itadr adr idr X u− − −= α +α +α + β+η + γ + .  
idr and the variables in the vector Xit-1 are considered as predetermined and 
instrumented by their lagged values up to the second lag.  
Definitions of variables: adrit=(dit+eit)/eit, where dit=(longterm debt+current liabilites) and eit=(longterm 
debt+current liabilites+market value of equity); idr=dit-1/(dit-1+eit-1(1+rit-1,it), where rit-1,it is the external stock 
return from (t-1) to t; The Xit-1 vector contains the following variables: fix=fixed assets over total assets; 
size=log(total assets); shield=depriciation and amortizations plus investment tax credits over total assets; 
profit_ta=EBIT over total assets; growth=relative change of total assets from year (t-1) to t;  
uniq_rd=research&development expenses over sales; tax_ta=paid income taxes over total assets;  volat=the 
standard deviation of the rate of return on the stock;  debt_con=interest payments over EBIT. The sample 
contains firms in the Compustat database with non-missing observations for the relevant variables over the years 
1992 to 2001. All the series are expressed in $ of 2001. The ratios are expressed in %. Robust std. errors in 
brackets. Time dummies and constant included. Sargan test from two-step estimator. Coefficients that are 
significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level are marked with **,*, and (*) respectively. 
 
adrit expected 
sign 
GMM GMM with
idrit-1,it 
 
OLS OLSwith 
 adrit-1 
OLS with 
adrit-1 and 
idrit-1,it 
adrit-1 + 0.285** 
(0.067) 
0.021 
(0.063) 
- 
 
0.962** 
(0.023) 
0.081(*) 
(0.048) 
idrit-1,it + 
 
- 
 
0.603** 
(0.071) 
- 
 
- 
 
0.884** 
(0.043) 
fixit-1 + -0.036 
(0.086) 
-0.125 
(0.093) 
0.055** 
(0.017) 
0.024* 
(0.010) 
0.022** 
 (0.008) 
size_tait-1 +/- 3.625(*) 
(1.979) 
1.484 
(1.768) 
2.054** 
(0.347) 
0.117 
(0.161) 
-0.157 
(0.120) 
shieldit-1 - 0.129 
(0.583) 
0.484 
(0.427) 
-0.627** 
(0.204) 
-0.197 
(0.145) 
-0.210 
(0.136) 
profit_tait-1 +/- 0.017 
(0.027) 
-0.003 
(0.024) 
-0.195** 
(0.074) 
0.016 
(0.038) 
0.046 
(0.048) 
growth_tait-1 - -0.010 
(0.009) 
-0.012 
(0.010) 
-0.019(*) 
(0.010) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
uniq_rdit-1 - 0.001 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.049(*) 
(0.027) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
tax_tait-1 + 0.101 
(0.165) 
0.170 
(0.131) 
-1.317** 
(0.210) 
0.059 
(0.111) 
0.029 
(0.119) 
volatit-1 - -3.058 
(7.614) 
-6.543 
(6.947) 
-12.417**
(3.837) 
-0.536 
(2.207) 
-0.157 
(1.557) 
debt_conit-1 - -0.019 
(0.012) 
-0.016* 
(0.007) 
0.064** 
(0.025) 
-0.011 
(0.009) 
-0.013** 
(0.005) 
N  982 982 1556 1555 1555 
Nb. of groups  350 350    
Wald /F 2χ  67.39 185.63 31.38** 247.58** 546.07** 
R2  - - 0.27 0.76 0.86 
z2  0.06 0.35 - - - 
Sargan test  204.96 220.32 - - - 
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Table 3. Capital structure inertia and adjustment asymmetries  
 
The tables 3.a. and 3.b.  present GMM estimates (one-step estimator) of the following regression: 
0 1 1 2 1,it it it it i t itadr adr idr u− −= α +α +α + η + γ + .  
idr is considered as predetermined and instrumented by their lagged value up to the second lag. The sample is 
split up depending on whether the firm increased ( 0itadr∆ > ) or lowered ( 0itadr∆ < ) its leverage from year  
(t-1) to t, where 1(it it itadr adr adr )−∆ = −
) 0>
 and depending on whether the firm is overleveraged 
( ( ) or underleveraged (*1 1it itadr adr− −− *1( itadr− 1itadr − ) 0− <
it
) in period (t-1). The optimal debt level 
 is the fitted value of the fixed effects estimation of* 1itadr − 1 0 t itX u1it i− −adr = α + γ +β +η + , where 1itX −  is 
the vector of capital structure determinants as outlined in table 2. 
Definitions of variables: adrit=(dit+eit)/eit, where dit=(longterm debt+current liabilites) and eit=(longterm 
debt+current liabilites+market value of equity); idr=dit-1/(dit-1+eit-1(1+rit-1,it), where rit-1,it is the external stock 
return from (t-1) to t. The sample contains firms in the Compustat database with non-missing observations for 
the relevant variables over the years 1992 to 2001. All the series are expressed in $ of 2001. The ratios are 
expressed in %. Robust std. errors in brackets. Time dummies and constant included. Sargan test from two-step 
estimator. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level are marked with 
**,*, and (*) respectively;  sig. indicates the significance level of the two-sided means difference test.  
 
Table 3.a. Capital structure inertia and  
     change in leverage 
 increased 
leverage 
0itadr∆ >  
lowered 
leverage 
0itadr∆ <
 
sig. 
1itadr −  -0.065
(*) 
(0.037) 
0.049 
(0.045) 
** 
 
1,t tidr −  0.512
** 
(0.063) 
0.682** 
(0.053) 
** 
N 
No. of  
groups 
Wald  2χ
z2 
Sargan test 
1715 
694 
 
168.91 
0.92 
79.23 
 
1629 
681 
 
187.08 
2.65 
57.61 
 
 
 
Table 3.b. Capital structure inertia and optimal leverage 
 overleverage 
*
1 1( )it itadr adr− −− > 0 *1 1( )it itadr adr− − 
underleverage 
0− <  
sig. 
1itadr −  -0.022 
(0.033) 
0.030 
(0.079) 
** 
1,t tidr −  0.672
** 
(0.054) 
0.218* 
(0.094) 
** 
N 
No. of  
groups 
Wald  2χ
z2 
Sargan test 
2981 
793 
 
420.67 
0.75 
61.62 
646 
261 
 
27.25 
0.34 
60.75 
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Table 4. Capital structure inertia and firm performance 
 
The table presents GMM estimates (one-step estimator) of the following regression: 0 1 1 2 1,it it it it i t itadr adr idr u− −= α +α +α +η + γ + . idr is considered as predetermined 
and instrumented by ist lagged value up to the second lag. The sample is split up according to whether the firm-specific performance measure is lower or higher than the year-
specific sample median.  
Definitions of variables: adrit=(dit+eit)/eit, where dit=(longterm debt+current liabilites) and eit=(longterm debt+current liabilites+market value of equity);        idr=dit-1/(dit-1+eit-
1(1+rit-1,it), where rit-1,it is the external stock return from (t-1) to t; roa=return on assets; roe=return on equity; q=[total assets+(market value of equity-book value of equity)]/total 
assets;  profit_ta=EBIT/total assets; eps=earnings per share. 
The sample contains firms in the Compustat database with non-missing observations for the relevant variables over the years 1992 to 2001. All the series are expressed in $ of 
2001. The ratios are expressed in %. Robust std. errors in brackets. Time dummies and constant included. Sargan test from two-step estimator. Coefficients that are significantly 
different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% lever are marked with **,*, and (*) respectively;  sig. indicates the significance level of the two-sided means difference test.  
 
adrit low 
roa 
high 
roa 
sig
. 
low 
roe 
high 
roe 
sig.    low
q 
high 
q 
sig. low
profit_ta 
high 
profit_ta 
sig
. 
low 
eps 
high 
eps 
sig. 
adrit-1 
 
-0.059 
(0.041) 
0.104* 
(0.044) 
** -0.068 
(0.046) 
0.046 
(0.045) 
** -0.041 
(0.038) 
0.126(*) 
(0.065) 
** -0.047 
(0.042) 
0.091* 
(0.043) 
** -0.112* 
(0.047) 
0.089(*) 
(0.046) 
** 
idrit-1,it 
 
0.753** 
(0.064) 
0.439** 
(0.070) 
**  0.726**
(0.076) 
0.459**
(0.066) 
** 0.678** 
(0.059) 
0.684** 
(0.078) 
0.726** 
(0.064) 
0.557** 
(0.073) 
** 0.720** 
(0.072) 
0.475** 
(0.060) 
** 
N                1758 1864 1759 1862 1878 1745 1755 1859 1519 1804
Nb. of groups 597               593 627 607 547 559 589 577 578 568
Wald  2χ 437.25             107.93 303.62 131.07 555.34 124.80 385.70 142.01 197.84 251.97
z2 1.21               -0.70 0.47 -0.29 0.38 0.22 0.47 0.90 1.01 0.06
Sargan test                62.73 78.84 54.94 68.44 49.48 65.50 43.64 66.00 48.32 53.77
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Table 5. Capital structure inertia and transaction costs 
 
The table presents GMM estimates (one-step estimator) of the following regression: 
0 1 1 2 1,it it it it i t itadr adr idr u− −= α +α +α +η + γ + .  
idr is considered as predetermined and instrumented by ist lagged values up to 
the second lag. The sample is split up according to whether the firm-specific 
characteristic such as size and stock market volatiltiy is lower or higher than the 
year-specific sample median.  
Definitions of variables: adrit=(dit+eit)/eit, where dit=(longterm debt+current 
liabilites) and eit=(longterm debt+current liabilites+market value of equity); 
idr=dit-1/(dit-1+eit-1(1+rit-1,it), where rit-1,it is the external stock return from (t-1) to t; 
size=log(total assets); volat=the standard deviation of the rate of return on the 
stock. The sample contains firms in the Compustat database with non-missing 
observations for the relevant variables over the years 1992 to 2001. All the series 
are expressed in $ of 2001. The ratios are expressed in %. Robust std. errors in 
brackets. Time dummies and constant included. Sargan test from two-step 
estimator. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% lever are marked with **,*, and (*) respectively;  sig. indicates the significance 
level of the two-sided means difference test.  
 
adrit low 
size 
high 
size 
sig. low 
volat 
high 
volat 
sig. 
adrit-1 
 
-0.065 
(0.045) 
0.034 
(0.046) 
** 0.101* 
(0.047) 
-0.072(*) 
(0.042) 
** 
idrit-1,it 
 
0.720**
(0.088) 
0.538** 
(0.055) 
** 0.448**
(0.057) 
0.692** 
(0.071) 
** 
N 1695 1927  1822 1603  
Nb. of groups 478 484  478 519  
Wald  2χ 124.85 309.05  247.22 149.30  
z2 0.10 0.99  1.85 -0.87  
Sargan test 46.76 79.26  72.16 53.48  
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Table 6.a. The role of option shares Table 6. Capital structure inertia and executive compensation 
 adrit low 
opt_sh 
high 
opt_sh 
sig.  low
opt_sh 
high 
opt_sh 
sig. 
adrit-1 
 
-0.057 
(0.043) 
0.010 
(0.047) 
** -0.118** 
(0.043) 
-0.036 
(0.041) 
** 
idrit-1,it 
 
0.570** 
(0.071) 
0.384** 
(0.065) 
** 0.371** 
(0.050) 
0.302** 
(0.053) 
** 
qit 
 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
  0.002
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
 
liqit 
 
2.207 
(4.807) 
6.153 
(6.092) 
  6.299
(4.254) 
8.295 
(5.671) 
 
sizeit 
 
- -   0.002
(0.002) 
0.899 
(1.131) 
 
roait - 
 
-  -0.094** 
(0.029) 
-0.047* 
(0.022) 
 
N 
No. of groups
1735 
602 
1591 
611 
  1734
601 
1591 
611 
 
Wald  2χ 208.13      94.91 228.87 100.45
z2 -0.40      0.11 -0.94 -0.21
Sargan test       111.60 83.19 166.58 129.96
The tables 6.a. to 6.d. present GMM estimates (one-step estimator) of the following 
regression: adr adr idr X u0 1 1 2 1,it it it it it i t it− −= α +α +α + β+ η + γ + .  
idr is considered as predetermined and instrumented by their lagged value up to the 
second lag. The sample is split up according to whether the firm-specific 
compensation characteristic option shares (opt_sh), compensation elasticity 
(comp_e)l, variable salary component (var_sal) and shareownership of the CEO 
(shrownpc) is lower or higher than the year-specific sample median.  
Xit  is a vector of control variables as described in the text.   
Definitions of variables: adrit=(dit+eit)/eit, where dit=(longterm debt+current 
liabilites) and eit=(longterm debt+current liabilites+market value of equity);  
idr=dit-1/(dit-1+eit-1(1+rit-1,it), where rit-1,it is the external stock return from year (t-1) 
to t. opt_shit=(blk_valueit/tccit), where blk_valueit=value of stock option grants to 
CEO; tccit=total current compensation including base salary plus bonus; 
comp_el1it= %change of  tdc/ %change mktval from year (t-1) to t, where tdcit=total 
compensation (tcc plus options exercised) and mktvalit=market value of common 
stocks; var_comit=(tdcit--salaryit)/tdcit; shrownpcit=% of company’s shares owned 
by CEO; qit=[total assets+(market value of equity-book value of equity)]/total 
assets; liqi=liquidity constraints which takes the value of one if the firm did not pay 
a dividend in the last year and zero else;  size=log(total assets); roait=return on 
assets; bs_volatit=std. deviation of the rate of return on the stock; price_closeit 
=price of the stock at the end of the fiscal year. The sample contains firms in the 
Compustat database with non-missing observations for the relevant variables over 
the years 1992 to 2001. All the series are expressed in $ of 2001. The ratios are 
expressed in %. Robust std. errors in brackets. Time dummies and constant 
included. Sargan test from two-step estimator. Coefficients that are significantly 
different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level are marked with **,*, and (*) 
respectively;  sig. indicates the significance level of the two-sided means difference 
test.  
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Table 6c. The role of the variable salary component var_sal: Table 6b. The role of the compensation elasticity comp_el: 
    
adrit low 
var_sal
high 
var_sal
sig.  low
var_sal 
high 
var_sal 
sig. 
adrit-1 
 
-0.061 
(0.045) 
-0.002 
(0.052) 
** -0.144** 
(0.042) 
-0.062 
(0.049) 
** 
idrit-1,it 
 
0.749** 
(0.086) 
0.384** 
(0.060) 
** 0.415** 
(0.049) 
0.289** 
(0.051) 
** 
sizeit - -  5.745** 
(2.004) 
0.254 
(1.402) 
 
roait 
 
-   - -0.096** 
(0.028) 
-0.062(*) 
(0.034) 
 
N 
No. of 
groups 
1707 
584 
 
1621 
591 
 
 1706 
583 
1621 
591 
 
Wald 2χ  207.14      145.20 208.79 147.05
z2 -1.19      0.61 -1.78 0.11
Sargan test       39.16 70.83 113.28 112.71
adrit low 
comp_el 
high 
comp_el 
sig.  low
comp_el 
high 
comp_el 
sig. 
adrit-1 
 
-0.103* 
(0.047) 
-0.058 
(0.048) 
** -0.108* 
(0.045) 
-0.074 
(0.045) 
** 
idrit-1,it 
 
0.448** 
(0.062) 
0.349** 
(0.064) 
** 0.414** 
(0.054) 
0.311** 
(0.055) 
** 
sizeit -3.147 
(2.043) 
4.270* 
(1.998) 
  -0.552
(1.704) 
6.319** 
(1.637) 
 
roait 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 -0.046** 
(0.017) 
-0.101* 
(0.041) 
 
N 
No. of 
groups 
1625 
698 
1680 
686 
  1624
697 
1680 
686 
 
Wald  2χ 176.04      139.94 191.52 162.33
z2 0.17      -0.39 0.14 -0.56
Sargan test 99.10      93.61 127.29 126.28
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Table 6d. The role of the shareownership shrownpc: 
  
adrit low 
shrownp
c 
high 
shrownpc 
sig. low
shrownpc 
high 
shrownpc
sig. 
adrit-1 
 
-0.071 
(0.048) 
-0.137* 
(0.060) 
** -0.087(*) 
(0.049) 
-0.148* 
(0.058) 
** 
idrit-1,it 
 
0.519** 
(0.069) 
0.517** 
(0.077) 
 0.500** 
(0.065) 
0.498** 
(0.072) 
 
sizeit 
 
1.572 
(1.583) 
2.662 
(1.744) 
  1.878
(1.427) 
3.204(*) 
(1.705) 
 
bs_volatit 19.294* 
(8.168) 
-8.530 
(11.677) 
 15.357* 
(7.119) 
-9.706 
(10.650) 
 
price_closeit 0.006 
(0.019) 
-0.049(*) 
(0.027) 
  0.004
(0.018) 
-0.044(*) 
(0.025) 
 
roait 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 -0.036(*) 
(0.020) 
-0.121* 
(0.051) 
 
N 
No. of 
groups 
901 
347 
855 
242 
 901 
347 
855 
242 
 
Wald  2χ 179.62      125.09 191.92 136.47
z2 -0.36      -0.03 -0.55 0.20
Sargan test       132.78 135.71 150.55 151.45
 
  
